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INTRODUCTION
The French have a common saying, "Les jeux sont faits." In a legal
context, it means "the political choice has been made."' For example,
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. Thanks for the
comments and general support of Debbie Armstrong and Fred Hart, as well as the assistance of
Leo Romero, Amanda Hartman and Bryan Otero. I am particularly grateful for the fine re-
search assistance of Mari Cintron Garcia, as well as for the financial support of the University
of New Mexico School of Law.
** J.D. expected, University of New Mexico School of Law, May 2001. Thanks to An-
gelica Anaya-Allen for her comments on an earlier version of this Article.
I See Sophia Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos, From Formal to Substantive Gender Equality:
Are International and Community Law Converging?, II REVUE EUROPEENNE DE DROIT PUB
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with respect to equality between men and women, this phrase means that
the decision to provide equal rights has been made and that's the way it
is, regardless of how one feels about it. The issue is settled. By compar-
ison, the rights of the elderly to receive dignified long-term care "jeux ne
sont pas fait." The issue has not been decided. The political choice has
not been made. The tough questions have not been answered, or perhaps
even asked.
When Congress enacted the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (the
"BBA"), 2 which drastically reduced Medicare funds to nursing homes
and home-health care providers,3 both industries began to fail.4 Ten per-
cent of the nation's nursing homes are now operating in Chapter 115 and
over one-third of the nation's home-health care agencies in existence at
the time the BBA was passed have closed their doors. 6 While Congress
and the United States General Accounting Office (collectively referred to
herein as the "Government") have claimed that these budget cuts will not
effect the care that people receive,7 the evidence already suggests other-
LIC EUROPEAN (REVIEW OF PUBLIC LAW) 515, 516 (1999); see also JEAN PAUL SARTRE, LES
JEUX SONT FAIT (Nagel 1947).
2 See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat 251 (1997) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
3 See injra Part II.A.
4 See M. William Salganik, Golden Years Fade.or Nursing Home Chains: An Industr3 ,
Booming Only a Fe", Years Ago Struggles to Survive, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 5," , 2(00, at
I-D (reporting that 1,651 of the country's 17,000 nursing homes were operating under the
supervision of the bankruptcy courts); Sandra Brown Kelly, Home Health Care Companies
Die En Masse: Medicare' Drive to Cut Costs Forces Manx
, 
Companies to Go Belly' Up, ROA-
NOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, April 26, 1999, at Al (discussing home-health care agency
failures). See also Karin Fischer, Rural Health Agencies Hit Hard by Cuts, CHARLESTON GA-
ZETTE, July 5, 2000, at POIA (reporting that in West Virginia, 30% of the nursing homes in the
state have filed for Chapter I I bankruptcy); Ann Saphir, Bankruptcies' Ripple Efject: Chapter
II Filings Are Not Affecting Operations But Homes' Future Access To Capital Likel' to Suf-
fi, MODERN HEALTHCARE, March 20, 2000. (reporting that in New Mexico 47% of homes are
in bankruptcy, while in Colorado 24% are); Texas Nursing Homes Say Low Medicare Rates
Causing Crisis, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, July 1, 2000, at 8P (reporting that in Texas, 22% of all
nursing homes are now in bankruptcy).
5 See Saphir supra note 4.
6 See Richard Marini, Bill Would Reduce Cuts in Medicar'e Reimbu'sement, Nur-
seWeek/Health Week (July 12, 1999), at http://nurseweek.com/news/99-7/37a.html (last visited
April 7, 2001).
7 See inji'a Part II.B.; U. S. GEN. ACCOUrTING OFFICE, GAO-HEHS-99-120, MEDICARE
HOME HEALTH AGENCIES: CLOSURES CONTINUE, WITH LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT BENEFICIARY
ACCESS Is DENIED (1999) hereinafter MAY 1999 GAO REPORTI; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO-HEHS-00-23, SKILLED NURSING FACILITIES: MEDICARE PAYMENT CHANGES RE-
QUIRE PROVIDER ADJUSTMENTS BUT MAINTAIN ACCESS (1999) 1hereinafter DEC. 1999 GAO
REPORTI; see also Nursing Home Bankruptcies: What Caused Them? Hearings Before the
U.S. Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 10 6 1h Cong. (2000), http://www.senate.gov/-aging/
hr57.htm (hereinafter Nursing Home Bankruptcies). Dr. Charles Roadman, II, President of the
American Health Care Association stated,
I want to speak directly to recent assertions by the GAO that there is no crisis in long
term care, that bankruptcies affecting close to 2,000 skilled nursing facilities is not
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wise." Most people who have followed this legislation and its effects
believe that the cuts have been a disaster 9 and that there have been result-
ing human costs."'
The health-care portion of the BBA was enacted to eliminate profli-
gate spending on the part of care providers, to eliminate waste for unnec-
essary services, and to eliminate the propensity for fraud in these
industries.'' While this legislation may have achieved one or more of
these goals, it also has reduced both the availability of' 2 and the quality
problematic, and that any difficulties confronting all providers are the direct result of
business decisions ... . Bankruptcies among skilled nursing facilities have reached
an alarming figure of approximately 2,000 facilities in the last year alone. But, let
me state very, very clearly, on the record, to everyone here today: This is just the tip
of the iceberg. Our long term care community is facing a squeeze with the real
potential for absolute collapse that will put at risk care for all SNF patients-We are
faced with countless challenges affecting caregivers and patients alike . . . . My
assessment is clear--the government's commitment to fund quality care is waver-
ing-Medicare funding for nursing facility care has been seriously cut, and Medi-
caid programs across the country are traditionally and, in some cases, grossly
underfunded to the point of paying an average $4 per hour for care in a nursing
facility. Sadly, Mr. Chairman, this is less than we pay a teenage babysitter.
Id.
n Ironically, Congress is now considering imposing mandatory federal staffing standards
on the entire industry. See Robert Pear, Nursing Home Crisis Targeted. TIMES UNION (AL-
BANY), July 23, 2000, at Al. Of course, now that Medicare reimbursement rates are so low,
most homes cannot afford to hire more staff. See id.: see also Politics and Polic' Nursing
Homes: HHS Recommends Strict New Staffing Rules, AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK: AMERI-
CAN HEALTH LINE, July 24, 2000, at 5.
9 See Nursing Home Bankruptcies, supra note 7. Dr. Roadman stated, "ITihe typical
[nursing home resident I puts the overall quality of his or her life in the hands of our profession.
It's our charge to provide quality medical care to improve their health and quality of life." Id.
He also said, "The current economic crisis threatens both current and future beneficiary ac-
cess-without adequate reimbursement to meet operating and capital requirements, providers
cannot survive." Id.
tO See Nancy Peterman, American Bankruptcv Institute: The Healthcare Industry Bank-
ruptcv Workouts Forum, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 20 (2000) (discussing how the Bal-
anced Budget Act is likely to create a shakeout similar to the real estate shakeout created by
the 1986 tax reforms, but this time with real human costs); Editorial, A Health Care Disaster
in the Making, Federal Missteps: Cuts in Medicare Reimbursements are Strangling Medical-
Deliver*
, 
Systems, THE BALTIMORE SUN, July 7, 2000, at A16 (stating that the cuts that bal-
anced the budget have "lowered the quality of health care for millions of Americans-espe-
cially senior citizens-and have seriously eroded the viability of hospitals, nursing homes,
home-health care companies and health plans for the elderly").
II See DEC. 1999 GAO REPORT supra note 7 at 1; COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM & OVER-
SIGHT, MEDICARE HOME HEALTH SERVICES: No SURETY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST FRAUD AND
WASTE, H.R. REP. No. 105-821, 5-12 (1998).
12 See, e.g., Malia Rulan, Cuts in Medicare Limit Care: Elderly, Disabled in W. Va.
Affected, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 21, 2000, at A02: see also Christopher Clark, New
Medicare Rules Pose Tough Choices, Los ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 21, 2000, at A 19; Therese
Smith Cox, Medicare Cuts Bite into Home Health Care, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Oct. 12,
1999, at PIC.
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of' 3 rehabilitation care to the nation's elderly. A small percentage of the
cuts have been reversed in the past several months, in order to undo some
of the unintended effects of the BBA, 14 but this has by no means elimi-
nated the harm. Long-term care industries have begged Congress to fur-
ther reduce these cuts, going so far as engaging in a national TV
campaign. 15 So far Congress has not done S0.16
The situation is both depressing and frightening, yet most of the
American public has hardly noticed. When asked why so little public
and media attention has been directed to this issue, one Elder Law stu-
dent's comment was apt:
People don't want to hear about it. Aging is depressing;
nursing homes are more so. And nursing homes in
bankruptcy? That's just too much. The home-health
care news is no better. You tell us about the stroke vic-
tim who had to choose, under the new Medicare reim-
bursement system, between therapy for walking and
therapy for talking. I'm interested. When you then fol-
low up with how he chose talking and then fell down
from frailty and ended up dead, people don't want to
hear about this guy, to think about him. Life is just too
short. 17
13 See Richard Teetsel, Efforts to Improve Health Care Have Only Made Things Worse,
BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 24, 1999, at C2. In Massachusetts, nursing home wages are sometimes
lower than fast food wages. One nursing home owner reported that she was unable to keep
good staff because she could not afford to pay them enough. See Karen Hsu, Elder Advocates
Say Poor Wages Affecting Care, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 18, 20(H), at B-I.
14 See, e.g.. John E. Mulligan, Medicare Give-Backs Pass in Budget Vote, PROVIDENCE
JOURNAL. Nov. 19, 1999, at A16. The budget cuts in the BBA created a Federal surplus, and
many politicians have taken credit for that surplus. See Remarks by the President to the Demo-
cratic Leadership Council: Conjrrence on "New Challenges of the New Economy, M2 Press-
wire, Apr. 5, 2000, available at 2000 WL 18095372.
15 See Week in Healthcare: Inside the Beltway, MODERN HEALTHCARE, July 24, 2000, at
8. This report notes that a coalition of hospital groups, pharmaceutical companies and health-
care systems ran national television advertisements to encourage Congress to increase Medi-
care provider payments restrained under the BBA. According to the article, the ads are part of
a $30 million dollar campaign directed at influencing Congress and the next president about
the dire financial conditions in these industries. See id.
16 After seeing the first effects of the BBA of 1997, Congress attempted to ameliorate
some of these effects with the enactment of Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999. See
Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 1000(a)(6), 113 Stat. 1501A-321 (1999). Under the BBA of 1999,
further reductions in reimbursements were to take place in October of 2)00. However, in July
2000, Congress acted to waive these cuts until 2(X)I. See Mark Taylor, Long-Term Care
Reaps Billionsfi'om HCFA, MODERN HEALTHCARE, July 31, 2000, at 6. These "givebacks," as
well as other financial factors, are predicted to increase Medicare payments to skilled nursing
facilities by as much as 20%. See Medicare Will Increase Pay to Nursing Homes During
Fiscal 2001, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2000, at B2.
17 Interview between Nathalie Martin and anonymous Elder Law student, New Mexico
School of Law, in Albuquerque, N.M. (Mar. 10, 2t000).
LES JEux NE SONT PAS FAITS
This Article explores issues that we, as a society, would rather not,
but must, discuss. These issues include aging, how the future costs of
long-term care will be paid, and what form and quality of long-term care
will continue to be financed through Medicare. More specifically, this
Article discusses the philosophical issues raised by the cuts, as well as
the practical implications of the cuts for patients and residents. It also
attempts, primarily through information about the administrative and
other costs of the federal bankruptcy process, to refute government
claims that these cuts have not and will not affect patient care.
Part I of this Article describes the extent of the financial failure in
the nursing home and home-health industries, briefly explains what funds
were cut by the BBA, and briefly describes the Government's position
with respect to the effects of the cuts.' 8 Because so many long-term care
providers are now operating under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,
Part II describes the general Chapter I I process, the difficulty of success-
fully reorganizing under Chapter 11, the high direct and indirect costs of
all bankruptcy proceedings, and the risks that bankruptcy poses for pa-
tients and residents.' 9 Part III discusses other risks created by the cuts,
particularly the unavailability of necessary care. 2" Part IV calls for a
public discourse about our national policy with respect to both aging and
funding long-term care with public funds. 2' Ultimately this Article con-
cludes that we left too much up to Congress, in expecting it to be able to
address this complex and taboo issue. The legislation enacted by Con-
gress in 1997, in order to balance the budget, was not well thought-out
and has created risks to long-term care recipients that were neither con-
templated nor condoned. 22
This Article ultimately recommends that in the very near future,
policy-makers develop a long-term strategy with respect to which long-
term care services will be funded through Medicare. 23 By fostering a
public dialog to facilitate discussion of this issue, society can make real
choices about health care, politicians can be made accountable for legis-
lating this policy, and Congress can be forced to act in accordance with
it.24
I See infra Part I1.
19 See infia Part III.
20 See infra Part IV.
21 See infra Part V.
22 See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
23 See infr-a notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
24 See infr)'a notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
2000]
134 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 10:129
I. THE BALANCED BUDGET ACT AND FINANCIAL FAILURE
IN LONG-TERM CARE
Between September of 1999 and June of 2000, five of this country's
largest nursing home chains filed for protection under Chapter I I of the
Bankruptcy Code. 25 On September 13, 1999, Vencor, Inc. of Atlanta,
Georgia, which operates 293 nursing homes and 56 hospitals, filed for
Chapter 11 protection.26 On October 14, 1999, Vencor was joined by
Sun Healthcare Systems of Albuquerque, New Mexico, which operates
369 homes and serves 40,000 people nationwide. 27 On January 18,
2000, a third large chain of nursing homes, Mariner Post-Acute Network,
Inc., filed for bankruptcy. 28 Integrated Health Systems, Inc., the nation's
fourth largest chain, filed for Chapter I I in February of 2000,29 and Gen-
esis Health Services Corporation, the nation's fifth largest chain, fol-
lowed suit in June of 2000.30 Many stand-alone homes and smaller
chains also have filed for Chapter II since the budget cuts went into
effect. 3' Thus, over 175,000 nursing home residents now live in a home
that is in bankruptcy. 32
The home-health care industry has been affected to an even greater
degree by the budget cuts, with over one-third of all agencies now
closed, 33 and many remaining firms operating in bankruptcy. 34 The
25 See infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text. Frontier Group, Inc., Lenox Health
Care, Inc., and New Care Health Corp. have also filed for bankruptcy. See Dan Margolies &
Julius Karrash, Nursing Home IndustrY Staggers Under Filings: Bankruptc, Moved Blamed on
Medicare Cuts, Debt, Scrutiny, KANSAS CITY STATE, Feb. 5, 2000, at Al.
26 See Scott Thurston, Nursing Home Operator Seeks to Reorganize its Finances, AT-
LANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 19, 2000, at D3.
27 See Gayle Geis O'Dowd, Creditors, Sui Craft Debt Deal, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 27,
1999, at A I.
28 See Harold J. Adams. Another Nursing Home Goes Bankrupt: Mariner .loins Stn
Healthcare and Vencor, COURIER-. (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 19, 2000, at 14B.
29 See Bruce Jaspen, Integrated Health in Chapter II, Nursing Home Chain Blames
Reductions in Medicare Spending Growth, CHICAGO TRIB., Feb. 4, 2000, at A-I.
30 See Nursing Home Firm In Chapter II. ALBUQUERQUE J., June 24, 2000, at Cl.
31 In February of 2000, Professor Martin began conducting empirical research about the
number of nursing homes, outside the big four chains that had filed at that time, that were in
bankruptcy. The research was conducted by sending a letter to most of the Unites States
Bankruptcy Judges, asking them to identify any nursing homes that had filed in the past year.
By March 30, 2000, over 60 judges had responded, reporting over 40 cases. Although the
letter did not request information about home-healthcare bankruptcies (because we were una-
ware of the proliferation of such cases at the time the letter was sent), many judges reported
having no nursing home cases but many home-healthcare agency cases.
32 There are over 177,000 beds in bankrupt nursing homes. See Salganik, supra note 4, at
D1.
33 See Andy Miller, Medicare Cuts: IndustrY Taking a Big Hit: Home Health Care Agen-
cies, Hospitals & Nursing Homes Are Still Reeling, THE ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 31, 1999, at
H 1. There also has been a 40% decrease in revenues to home health care agencies, which has
created a national crisis. See id. Many patients previously treated at home are receiving treat-
ment in hospital emergency rooms now. See id.
34 See Kelly, supra note 4, at A I.
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BBA cut Medicare payments to home health care agencies by 15%, and
according to some estimates, these cuts put as many as 50% of home
health care agencies across the country out of business. 35 Lawmakers
projected that the BBA would save $10 billion in Medicare by cutting
back on home health care services, but the savings have been more in the
range of $46 billion.36
Ironically, only the wealthier failing businesses can even afford to
file for bankruptcy, because the added administrative costs are so high. 37
The smallest and the most cash-poor home health care providers, and
those most likely to provide services to the poor, have instead just closed
their doors and disappeared. 38
A. WHAT THE BALANCED BUDGET ACT CUT
Before the BBA, Medicare reimbursed nursing homes and home-
health care providers for all costs incurred in caring for patients. 39 Con-
gress felt these reimbursement policies created the wrong incentives for
homes and home-health care agencies, some of which may have been
providing more care than was actually needed.4 1' As a result, Congress
enacted the BBA, a prospective reimbursement system that caps the
amount a nursing home or home-care provider can be reimbursed for
each particular patient.4 1 It also limits the number of rehabilitation visits
each person can receive.
For example, starting in January of 1999, payments were capped at
80% of the lower of the actual charges or the amount paid, under a physi-
35 See Harold J. Adams, Home-Health Industry Adjusts to Cuts: Some Shakeout Survi-
vors Thrive Under New Rate, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Feb. 7, 2000, at IC.
36 See Chris Meehan, Abraham Aims to Halt Medicare Bleeding, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS,
Sept. 21, 1999, at BI.
37 See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Busi-
ness Bankruptc",, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499, 500 (1999) (stating that most Chapter I I cases are
very small by the time that they are filed and that "it is unclear whether the vast majority of
these debtors Ican] support the complex Chapter II reorganization structure, even if they had
viable businesses" and that "Chapter I I may be too expensive for most of the businesses that
file").
38 Newspapers report that as of September of 1999, over 2,500 home-health care agen-
cies have closed their doors. See Meehan, supra note 36, at B 1. While some of the budget cuts
have been reversed, in order to ameliorate some of the unplanned consequences of the BBA
this has not protected home-health care providers from financial crisis. See Mulligan, supra
note 14, at A19. For example, one of Florida's largest home-health care agencies, Flagship
Healthcare, filed a petition under Chapter 7, despite the "give-backs." See Business Today:
Correction, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 8, 2000, at IE. Meanwhile, some people have died as
a result of not receiving proper treatment. See Clark, supra note 14, at A19.
39 See Chris Adams, GAO Says Woes of Nursing-Home Firms Aren't Caused Only by
Medicare Policy, WALL STREET J., Dec. 27, 1999, at A20.
40 See DEC. 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 7 at I.
41 See id. at 6.
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cian fee schedule.42 Moreover, beginning on January 1, 1999, an annual
per beneficiary limit of $1,500 applies to all outpatient physical therapy
services, except for services provided by hospital outpatient depart-
ments.43 This interpretation requires patients to choose between physical
therapy and speech therapy, even if both are needed. It purportedly has
caused patients to put off receiving therapy, in order to "save" their bene-
fits for more severe problems that could arise later in the year.44
A separate $1,500 per beneficiary limit applies to all outpatient oc-
cupational therapy services except for those services furnished by hospi-
tal outpatient departments.45 The physical, speech, and occupational
therapy caps are not subject to increase until 2002.46 Although President
Clinton signed an omnibus budget package that contained a two-year
moratorium on the $1,500 per person cap on November 29, 1999,47 and
the Health Care Finance Administration reduced some of the future cuts
on July 26, 2000, effective as of October 2000,4x the BBA has had a
devastating effect on care for the elderly.49 For example, the BBA re-
duced Vencor's medical funding by $200 million per year, but did not
reduce the number of patients cared for by Vencor.5 11 Sun Health Care
reported that the Balanced Budget Act cut its revenues by more than
$700 million, without changing the quality of care that it was required to
provide to residents.5' Similarly, home-health care providers' budgets
have been so drastically cut that care is now impossible to obtain in some
areas.5
2
42 See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33 § 4541, Il1 Stat. 251, 455-456
(1997) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1395m (1994 & Supp. V. 1999)).
4. See id. § 4541, II1 Stat. at 456-457 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 13951).
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 See id.
47 See Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 1000(a)(6), 113 Stat. 1501A-321 (1999).
48 See Taylor, supra note 16, at 8.
49 For example, Medicare payment cutbacks are projected to reduce spending at skilled
nursing facilities by nearly twice as much as Congress expected; between 1998-2004, federal
spending at these facilities is projected to be $15.8 billion less than what Congress anticipated.
See Report: Cutbacks at Nursing Facilities Due to Balanced Budget Act, CONGREss DAILY,
Aug. 9, 2000, 2000 WL 21160922 (emphasis added).
50 See Andrew Wolfson, Entrepreneur Reached Too Far, Too Fast: Local Hero's Star
Faded Along With Vencor's, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 21, 1999, at 01A. The BBA
cut daily reimbursements per patient by 20%. See id.
51 See e.g., Chris Pope, Sun Healthcare Files fir Pr-otection: Industr,-Wide Problem
Seen, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Worchester, Mass.), Oct. 16, 1999, at B8; Sun Healthcare
Group Inc., Third-Quarter Loss Posted on New Rules frr Medicare, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8,
1999, at C30.
52 See Cox supra note 12, at PIC.
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B. GOVERNMENT DENIAL OF CONNECTION BETWEEN INDUSTRY
FAILURE AND THE BBA
Not long after the bankruptcy filings of the first two huge nursing
home chains, the General Accounting Office ("GAO") investigated the
causes of the nursing home bankruptcies. 53 In a report that was released
in December of 1999, the GAO essentially states that "[r]ecent changes
in Medicare payments aren't entirely to blame for the bankruptcy-court
filings of two big nursing-home companies." 54 The report states that
their large total losses stem from high capital-related costs, reduced de-
mand for ancillary services (caused by other portions of the BBA), and
substantial nonrecurring expenses and write-offs reflecting reductions in
future anticipated earnings. 55 Another cause, according to the GAO re-
port, was the failure of nursing homes to react quickly enough to the
changes in reimbursement policies.56 Despite being called "other"
causes, many of these conditions flow directly from the changes in the
law.
Similarly, even though "one-third of home healthcare agencies op-
erating when the BBA was passed are no longer in business,"57 the GAO
report relating to financial problems in this industry denies any connec-
tion between the cuts and the financial problems. 58 Yet there is little
doubt that the BBA caused these agency closures and bankruptcies. 59
53 See DEC. 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 7.
54 Chris Adams, supra note 39 at A20 (emphasis added). Of course this would have to be
true, as all historic events have more than one cause. See also, DEC. 1999 GAO REPORT, stupra
note 7 at 13 ("Our analysis, however, suggests that the financial difficulties of Sun and Vencor
are the result of several factors beyond the SNFs [skilled nursing facilities] PPS [prospective
payment systeml.").
5 See DEC. 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 7 at 3.
56 See id.
57 Marini, supra note 6. Some estimate that up to 40% of home health care providers
have gone out of business. See Joseph M. Schifano & Paul Zucarelli, Long-Term Care Insur-
ance Can Save You a Bundle, TUCSON CITIZEN, Apr. 10, 2000, at 9A.
58 See DEC. 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 7 at 13. The same report also claims that the
closure of home health care agencies has not significantly affected the industry's ability to
provide services. See id at 2. (Medicare beneficiaries' ability to obtain needed care does not
appear to have decreased since the implementation of the SNFs [skilled nursing facilitiesl PPS
Iprospective payment systeml.")
59 See Peterman, supra note 10, at 7. One member of the panel stated:
The home healthcare industry has seen somewhere between a quarter and a third of
its businesses disappear since the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 came into effect.
Many of those businesses have disappeared, we've seen from real life examples,
because they simply couldn't make money under the current reimbursement scheme.
20001
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II. WHAT IS CHAPTER I I BANKRUPTCY AND WHAT ARE
ITS EFFECTS ON PATIENT CARE?
Some scholars and bankruptcy lawyers would surely claim that
bankruptcy, in and of itself, is not necessarily a bad thing. Bankruptcy,
particularly Chapter I1 reorganization, can give a company "a critical
respite from pressing financial difficulty. '611 No one would deny, how-
ever, that industry-wide bankruptcy indicates financial weakness in an
industry. Thus, by all ordinary financial standards, the nursing home and
the home-health care industries are very sick indeed. This weakened fi-
nancial condition does not merely affect lenders and suppliers - patients
and residents are also affected.
A. GENERAL BANKRUPTCY PRINCIPLES
Bankruptcy can prevent a failing business from going out of busi-
ness. 61 It creates an automatic stay of all collection activity that the
debtor may be facing. 62 It stops all lawsuits in their tracks, stops all
other collection activities, and allows the debtor a "breathing spell" in
order to work out its financial problems. 63 If the debtor files a Chapter
11 reorganization case, 64 rather than a Chapter 7 liquidation case, 65 the
debtor will be permitted to continue operating its business 66 and to pro-
pose a reorganization plan upon which creditors will vote. 67 A typical
Chapter 11 plan allows the debtor to pay creditors over time, often in a
60 See David R. Korobkin, The Unwarranted Case Against Corporate Reorganization: A
Reply to Bradley and Rozenzwieg, 78 IOWA L. REV. 669, 734 (1993).
61 See II U.S.C. §§ 1101- 1131 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999); see also Hope W. Olsson, The
RTC Intrusion Into Bankrutcyt,: A Crisis Solution at the Expense o" Equity, 42 BUFF. L. REV.
893, 914 (1994). According to this author,
The bankruptcy system is a vital part of the national economy .... The orderly
administration of bankruptcies has played an essential role in the evolution of our
market economy. Bankruptcy is a proven framework within which the economy
deals equitably and predictably with financial crises of individual entities, and Chap-
ter I I is a powerful tool for the orderly reorganization of businesses experiencing
financial difficulties.
See id.
62 See I I U.S.C. §362; see also WELL, GOTSHAL & MANGES, LLP, REORGANIZING FAIL-
ING BUSINESSES: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING
AND BUSINESS REORGANIZATION 5-2 to 5-4 (1998)1hereinafter REORGANIZING FAILING
BUSINESSES]
63 See II U.S.C. §362, REORGANIZING FAILING BUSINESSES, supra note 62, at 5-2 to 5-4
(describing the powers of the automatic stay).
64 See id. §§ 1101-1131.
65 See id. § 1129.
66 See id. §§ 1101-1131; see also REORGANIZING FAILING BUSINESSES, supra note 62, at
5-1 ("Chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code provides a financially troubled business with an
opportunity to restructure its finances to enable the continuation of its operations.").
67 See D. M. LYNN, MICHAEL R. ROCHELLE, AND ROBERT J. MOTTERN, 1997 COLLIER
HANDBOOK FOR TRUSTEES AND DEBTORS IN POSSESSION 26-6 (1997)lhereinafter COLLIER
HANDBOOK (explaining the Chapter II voting process).
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reduced amount. 68 Other typical Chapter 11 plans involve selling the eq-
uity in69 or the assets of the company to a purchaser, 711 or distributing the
company stock to shareholders in satisfaction of their claims.7 '
B. PREDICTORS OF A SUCCESSFUL REORGANIZATION
Many nursing home and home-health care employees, residents and
families, want to know the practical ramifications of these bankruptcies
on their facilities. Common questions include: 1) will the facility stay in
business, 2) will patient and resident interests be protected, and 3) will
staff lose their jobs? There are no easy answers to these questions. Un-
fortunately, most reorganization efforts fail for reasons explored in
greater detail below. 72 That does not mean that all of the nursing homes
and home-health care agencies in Chapter 1 1 will close their doors. It
does mean that eventually some will likely go out of business, displacing
some nursing home residents.
Studies show that the best predictor for success in Chapter 1 1 is a
company's size. 73 The bigger the debtor-company, the more likely that it
will emerge from Chapter I I operational, because it is better able to ab-
sorb the astronomical administrative fees that bankruptcy adds to regular
monthly costs. 7 4 Larger companies can also sell off assets in order to
raise operating capital. 75
Moreover, the shorter the bankruptcy case, the more likely it is that
the home or agency will stay in business. 76 Additionally, the more plan-
ning that a company can do before filing for bankruptcy, the better the
chances of emerging from bankruptcy. 77 However, it does not appear
68 See id. at 26-9 (referring to this type of plan as an "extension" plan).
69 See id.
70 See REORGANIZING FAILING BUSINESSES, supra note 62, at 11-39 to 11-40 (describing
plans involving sale of all or substantially all of the debtor's assets).
71 See COLLIER HANDBOOK, supra note 67, at 26-9 (referring to this type of plan as an
"equity conversion" plan).
72 See infra Part III.C.: see also Theodore Eisenberg, BankruptcO in the Administrative
States, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 17 (1987).
73 See Donald A. Jordan, Cross-Collateralization in Chapter /1: Protecting the Small
Business, 4 WAYNE L. REV. 219, 235 (1993).
74 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of'Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 50 (1996) (noting that
reorganization costs can equal 21% of a small company's entire worth, compared to only 3%
of a large company's worth).
75 See REORGANIZING FAILING BUSINESSES, supra note 62, at I 1-39.
76 See supra notes 81-88: see also generall' SOL STEIN, A FEAST FOR LAWYERS (1989)
(explaining in a humorous way why Chapter II costs money, including the lack of incentive
on the part of hourly-paid lawyers to help you wrap up your case).
77 See REORGANIZING FAILING BUSINESSES, supra note 62, at 12-4 (noting that a long
Chapter It case can have an adverse effect on operations); id. at 12-6 (noting that the costs of
a pre-packaged Chapter II case, in which the repayment plan is more or less approved by the
major creditors prior to filing for bankruptcy, are generally less than half as expensive as a
traditional Chapter II case).
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that there was much time for pre-bankruptcy planning before these nurs-
ing homes and home-health care providers filed for bankruptcy. 78 These
industries have been financed for years based upon the old Medicare re-
imbursement system, which was changed with little notice or opportunity
to restructure debt.79
Will these cuts affect patient care or will they simply, as some attor-
neys insist, provide homes with leverage to negotiate with banks? Anec-
dotal conversations with the attorneys for lenders suggest that lenders
think they are the only ones being hurt by the cuts. From their perspec-
tive, the bankruptcy cases will reduce bank debt, but patient care will not
suffer. According to one such creditor attorney, "the staff in these indus-
tries are so dedicated. They will use their own energy and resources to
protect patients if they have to.""" Not surprisingly, attorneys for the
elderly disagree; they think it is their clients who are taking the cuts on
the chin.8 ' Either way, nursing homes and home-health care agencies in
bankruptcy are now seeing a different kind of inefficiency, as funds are
78 See Peterman, supra note 10, at 18. As Professor Prince noted during a discussion of
this issue, while nursing homes were informed that there would be Medicaid cuts, they were
not told specifically what would be cut and how the cuts would take place until just before
they were implemented. As he further explained, "Published final rules with twelve-months of
advanced notice would have permitted an orderly transition into [the] new comprehensive
system." ld.
79 See id. Of course, if it is true, as some bank lawyers claim, that these cases have
affected only the debt structure and not the patients, then perhaps it doesn't matter how these
industries were financed. These industries had become darlings of Wall Street; their stock
prices had risen dramatically, based on industry profitability under the old reimbursement stan-
dards, as well as demographic data suggesting that this was a growing industry. See Peterman,
supra note 10, at 6-9 (discussing the high stock values for the health care industry in the past,
as well as the effect of the drop in revenues caused by the BBA).
8c' Interview between Nathalie Martin and Morton Branzberg, Partner, Klehr, Harrison,
Harvey, Branzberg and Elhers, in Santa Fe, N.M. (May 20, 2000). Yet because of the boom-
ing economy and job market, it is harder than ever to keep these positions filled with qualified
people. See Pear, suqpru note 8, at Al (noting that "it [is] hard to attract and retain good
workers in a booming economy, when the unemployment rate is at a 30-year low and other
industries offer less demanding, better-paying jobs").
81 Telephone Interview between Nathalie Martin and Ellen Leitzer, Co-Director of the
Senior Citizens Law Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico (May 3, 2001): see also Nursing
Home Bankruptcies, supra note 7 (statement of Dr. Charles Roadman, II, President, American
Health Care Association, discussing problems with access in rural areas and problems placing
patients): id. (statement of John Ransom, Director, Healthcare Research, Raymond James Fi-
nancial, stating that "the [nursing home] industry persists in a state of shock and demoraliza-
tion, with extreme difficulty attracting labor and capital"); see also Nursing Home Chain Files
Chapter I1: Vencor Runs Six Local Centers, DENVER POST, Sept. 14, 1999, at C14. The
article states:
"Patients and their families should be concerned," said Sarah Green Berger, execu-
tive director of the National Citizens Coalition for Nursing Home Reform in Wash-
ington, D.C. "I would want to see the situation stabilized before I suggest anyone use
a Vencor facility," Berger said. "You don't buy health care from a company that is
not in sound financial condition because they won't give quality care."
See id.
2000] LES JEUX NE SONT PAS FAITS 141
directed away from patient care and into the hands of bankruptcy attor-
neys and accountants.
C. THE HIGH COSTS OF BANKRUPTCY
Legal and other professional fees can be extremely expensive in
Chapter 11, making it difficult to operate profitably.8 2 Fees in a large
Chapter 11 reorganization case often cost tens of millions of dollars, and
for smaller firms, the fees sometimes equal the entire value of the firm.8 3
Each month in bankruptcy adds to the debtor's financial obligations. 4
All Chapter II professional fees are paid out of a debtor's assets,
either from profits or from a purchaser's investment money.8 5 No busi-
ness can reorganize if it cannot generate income over and above its cur-
rent expenses. 6 It must either pay its debts with profits or become
profitable enough to find a buyer to take over the business as a going
concern. If a company cannot be sold as a going concern or cannot pay a
82 See II U.S.C. § 330 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999) (allowing the payment of professional
fees in bankruptcy); see also LoPucki, supra note 74 at 50. LoPucki states that Chapter II
"generates direct costs ranging from a low of about three percent of the entire value of the
debtor's assets for large companies, to a high of over twenty-one percent for small compa-
nies." hi. citing:
Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation ol'the Bankruptcy Cost Ques-
tion, 39 J. FIN. 1067, 1076-78 (1984) (finding direct costs of large reorganization
cases to average 6.10% of total assets): Daryl M. Guffey & William T. Moore, Direct
Bankruptc3 , Costs: Evidence fiom the Trucking Industry, 26 FIN. REV. 223, 231
(1991): Robert M. Lawless et al., A Glimpse at Professional Fees and Other Direct
Costs in Small Firm Bankruptcies, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 847, 868 (finding in a study
of Chapter II cases in Memphis, Tennessee division of bankruptcy court, that direct
costs of bankruptcy averaged 21.55% of debtors' total assets as reported in petition);
Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337, 343 (1977)
(finding direct costs of large reorganization cases to average 4.0% of market value of
assets): Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation ol
Priority Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 290 (11990) (finding direct costs in large reor-
ganizations to average 3.1% of total assets): Michelle J. White, Bankrupty Costs
and the New Bankruptc)
, 
Code, 38 J. FIN. 477, 484 (1983) (finding direct costs of
large reorganization cases to average 6.0% of disbursements to all creditors).
83 See Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining
Model of Corporate Reorganizations, it CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 168,171 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss eds., 1996).
84 See REORGANIZING FAILING BUSINESSES, supra note 62, at 12-6. In addition to the
financial costs, the time spent in Chapter II can have an adverse impact on business and
operations. See id. at 12-4 to 12-5. Thus, it is critical for a company in Chapter II to complete
a reorganization plan, and quickly get out of bankruptcy.
85 See II U.S.C. § 303.
86 Under a common plan of reorganization, the debtor pays secured creditors in full over
several years and pays past-due unsecured obligations, though not in full, over a similar time
period. See id. § 1129. Obviously, these pre-petition obligations must be satisfied from funds
over and above current operating expenses.
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reorganization plan from profits, the company's assets will most likely
be sold piece-meal, perhaps for an entirely different utse.8 7
Because post-bankruptcy attorneys' fees are paid before any other
claims,8 the best cost-cutting strategy available at the outset of any
Chapter 11 case is to develop a business plan and an exit strategy for the
bankruptcy case before it is filed. Pre-planning can greatly reduce the
amount paid in legal and other professional fees, 9 and permit many
debtors to reduce debt and become profitable. Unfortunately, it is diffi-
cult to plan in advance.
Chapter 11 adds other layers of expense to operations as well. If a
debtor does not pay creditor claims in full, this is considered a "taking"
of property under the Constitution.9t Because it is unconstitutional to
take property without due process of law, the debtor is required to pro-
vide some minimal due process to creditors,9' normally provided by giv-
ing written notice to creditors of the many of debtor's actions throughout
the case. Paper notices circulate regarding every sale of assets outside
the ordinary course of business, every employee bonus plan, and every
contract rejection. Conversely, debtors must obtain court approval for
virtually all business activity that it wishes to engage in that is outside
the ordinary course of business. Of course, all of these additional proce-
dures cost hours of attorney and staff time.92
87 See id. § 363(b) (allowing the sale of any "property of the estate"). While selling the
assets as a "going concern" business is an obvious goal of Chapter 11, nothing in Section
363(b) limits sales to "going concern" sales. See Frederick Tung, Taking Future Claims Seri-
otus: Future Claims and Successor Liabilit
, 
in BankruptcY, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 435, 451.
Even asset sales must be accomplished quickly if creditors are to be paid a meaningful distri-
bution, because professional fees are paid before the claims of other creditors, including em-
ployee claims. See II U.S.C. §§ 503, 507. In order to keep nursing home residents in the same
location, an obvious goal in most cases, the homes must remain operational. See Marilyn
Denny, "This Is Who I Am, Don't Let Them Move Me," 2 QUINNIPIAc HEALTH L.J. 203, 203-
(14 (1999)(noting the trauma created when one moves a nursing home resident, even to a
different room).
88 See II U.S.C. § 507.
89 See REORGANIZiNG FAILING BUSINESSES, supra note 62, at 12-6.
9( See ALEXANDER GORDON, IV, GORDON ON MARYLAND FORECLOSURES 41-43. (1999
Supp.).
91 See COLLIER HANDBOOK, supra note 67, at 201-11.
92 See I I U.S.C. § 363: COLLIER HANDBOOK, supra note 67, at 20-11 to 20-12; see also
Deborah S. Griffin , Post-Termination Bankruptcy Considerations for the DeJaiulted Contrac-
tor', in 17 CONSTRUCTION LAW, 24, 32 (1997). A contractor-debtor filing a Chapter II peti-
tion, like any other debtor, faces a
variety of costs associated with a Chapter II reorganization effort, including the
costs of having the [debtor's] attorneys address the legal aspects of the reorganiza-
tion and the cost associated with redirecting company resources and personnel to
pursue and resolve the administrative aspects of the case. In general, whenever
bankruptcy court approval is necessary, there will be legal costs associated with the
preparation and filing of motion papers, together with court appearances and the
expense of negotiating and/or litigating disputes concerning the matters requiring
court approval. Apart from the legal costs, the company will invariably need to
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In addition, a debtor's staff is far, far busier in bankruptcy than
outside of bankruptcy. 93 While in bankruptcy, the debtor's accounting
staff will be required to prepare a variety of financial disclosures to many
different constituents. 94 There are also the added employee costs of hav-
ing people in court much of the time rather than at work.95 For upper
level management, bankruptcy can have high costs in employee mo-
rale, 96 product controls and quality, and even absenteeism. Also, em-
ployees may preemptively leave the company for fear of losing their
jobs. Employees in accounts payable have the difficult job of explaining
why the debtor cannot pay its pre-petition obligations outside a plan of
reorganization. 97
devote some internal resources to prepare and assemble the data and other informa-
tion necessary to seek such court approval most effectively. More specifically, [the
debtorl will face expense in filing motions for the use of cash collateral, to assume or
reject executory contracts, to respond to efforts seeking relief from the automatic
stay, to review and to respond to proofs of claim submitted by creditors, to prepare
and submit a disclosure statement, and to formulate, revise, negotiate and submit for
approval a reorganization plan. In addition to the legal costs, company personnel
and other resources will need to be utilized to gather the necessary information and
to evaluate the company's continuing financial needs and the profitability of various
Iprojects]. A debtor-in- possession also is required to file monthly operating state-
ments with the U.S. Trustee or the court. The Idebtorl faces additional expense in
obtaining court approval for the engagement of professional persons (e.g., attorneys,
accountants, appraisers) and for their periodic applications for compensation.
ld.
93 See COLLIER HANDBOOK, supra note 67, at 24-13 (describing the tremendous addi-
tional burdens of a bankruptcy filing on the debtor's staff, including preparing extra disclosure
documents, serving as witnesses at court hearings, keeping creditors happy despite pre-petition
nonpayment, and trying to maintain or create employee morale): see also REORGANIZING FAIL-
ING BUSINESSES, supra note 62, at 1-7 (noting that, at the very time that the debtor's manage-
ment is most needed to restructure the business, its time is taken up by huge numbers of
administrative tasks associated with the bankruptcy proceeding).
94 See Griffin, supra note 92, at 32 (noting the many disclosures required in Chapter 11,
including disclosures to the United States Trustee, the secured lender, and the court, among
others).
95 See COLLIER HANDBOOK, supra note 67, at 24-13.
96 See id.
97 There are also other indirect costs created by a bankruptcy filing. The court approval
process slows down business decisions, resulting in lost opportunity costs. See Reorganizing
Failing Businesses, supra note 62, at 1-8. Debtors in bankruptcy also must pay new deposits
for utilities. See II U.S.C. § 366 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999). Many suppliers will also demand
cash-on-delivery after bankruptcy, causing cash flow problems. Wealthier debtors can obtain
larger credit lines from their banks to make up for this increased demand for cash, but banks
may ask for a higher interest rate, further reducing profits and the likelihood of survival.
Smaller debtors could have difficulty obtaining credit at any rate, and thus might have to do
without some supplies or reduce other expenses. Some companies will simply go out of busi-
ness on a moment's notice. This has happened in the nursing home industry, leaving residents
in one California home scrambling to find replacement services on less than 24 hours' notice.
See Garmen Shiu, Nursing Home Residents Left Homeless: Bankruptcy Shuts Down Reseda
Care Center Without Warning, at http://www.cbs2.com/news/stories/news-970927-
013926.html (Sept. 27, 1997).
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Long-term care firms that are in bankruptcy must pay all these addi-
tional administrative costs, as well as regular operating costs, on a re-
duced budget.9 Moreover, most bankruptcy debtors are expected to
reduce costs even further once they file for bankruptcy, as a showing of
good faith in trying to reorganize.99 Yet few expenses can be reduced
without affecting patient and resident care. Staff is an obvious place to
cut costs because it is one of the biggest overhead items. " "' Reducing
staff does, however, dramatically affect care."1" Since the BBA, homes
have drastically cut back on staff; as a result, residents have been injured
more and had more bedsores, not to mention other health problems.11)2
Although large lenders have more leverage than most smaller creditors,
bank debt probably cannot be reduced significantly until other essentials
like supplies and utilities are cut first.1 3
While not all of the long-term care providers that are in bankruptcy
will go out of business, the additional costs of Chapter I I will make it
more difficult for these firms to survive."1 4 These bankruptcies, caused
98 See stq/a Part II.A.
99 See COLLIER HANDBOOK, supra note 67, at 24-21(listing common means of cutting
costs, such as reducing insurance, reducing staff, cutting utility usage, selling off unprofitable
assets or divisions, cutting out company cars and other expense items, leasing out extra space,
and rejecting unprofitable contracts).
100 See id.
1Ol See Pear, supra note 8, at AI.
102 See id. In fact, the harm to patients due to reduced staff has reportedly been so grave
that Congress is now considering legislation that would set federal guidelines for how many
staff hours each patient must receive. See id. Homes will be unable to afford to hire the
required people due to the prior legislative acts of Congress, however, which caused the very
problem about which Congress now complains. Notably, passing such a law under current
economic conditions would not increase staffing in nursing homes and would in no way
change the care being received by nursing home residents.
103 See COLLIER HANDBOOK, Sipl'.a note 67, at 25A-8 (discussing the need to abide by a
strict budget if a debtor must borrow money from a lender post-petition). Secured creditors
have greater leverage in a Chapter II case than unsecured creditors, and can thus demand cost
reductions at the expense of other creditors. See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy and the Entitle-
me/its Of the Government: Whose Moeiy Is If, Anyway?, 71) N.Y.U. L. REV. 993, 1058
( 1995)(noting that bankruptcy gives secured creditors the power to destroy an unsecured credi-
tors leverage with one stroke).
l(4 See James E. Bowers, Rehabilitation. Redistribution, or Dissipation: The Evidence fr
Choosing Between Bankrupt' v Hypotheses, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 955, 962 (1994) (noting that
the evidence does not suggest that Chapter I I is effective in most cases); Edith S. Hotchkiss,
The Post -Bankruptc, Pet])rmance o Firmis Emerging from Chapter I1, 50 J. FIN. 3,4 (1995)
(finding that 40% of firms emerging from bankruptcy continued in financial distress, with over
32% filing Chapter II again); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the
Bankruptc, Reorganization of Large, Publiclv-Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 598, 61)1
n.13 (1993) (noting that "it is estimated that no more than 30% will result in confirmed reor-
ganization plans"). Ultimately, only about 10% of all reorganizing debtors actually succeed at
reorganizing. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcv Policymaking in an7 Impeifect World, 92
MIcH. L. REV. 336, 373 n.99 (1993).
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almost exclusively by an uninformed act of Congress,115 have created
unnecessary inefficiency and pain, all of which could have been avoided
through better preparation and research. These cases have cost millions
of dollars, 1 6 which could have been used either to care for patients or to
reduce bank debt in these industries. The money could also have been
used to pay down financial obligations, thus aiding patients by minimiz-
ing their chances of receiving substandard care, as well as the likelihood
of displacement.
D. SQUARE PEGS IN ROUND HOLES: RESIDENTS HOLD NON-
ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THEIR FACILITIES' BANKRUPTCIES
Residents risk more in bankruptcy than merely undermined care
created by cash flow problems. The Bankruptcy Court's primary job in
any federal bankruptcy case is to ensure payment to creditors, rather than
to further resident and patient interests. 0 7 Traditionally, residents of
health-care facilities had absolutely no standing to be heard in the bank-
ruptcy case of their facility and thus no rights in the case at all."* While
courts are now permitted to balance the interests of health-care recipients
in a health care bankruptcy due to an amendment to the Bankruptcy
Code, 119 judges are not used to engaging in this type of balancing. Most
are accustomed to weighing economic interests only.'"' It is unclear
how these non-economic interests will be balanced against competing
economic claims, assuming judges are willing to consider them at all.'''
105 See Fischer, supra note 4, at POIA (stating that at least one Congressperson believes
Congress did not know the effects of the BBA when it enacted the legislation).
106 Author Nathalie Martin and research assistants Marisol Cintron Garcia, Sean Garrett,
and Daniela Gonzales, have gathered extensive data regarding the professional fees that have
been requested and allowed in these five large nursing home chain bankruptcies. Not all data
was available to us. Thus, the actual fees requested and allowed in these cases could be far
higher than those reported here. As of October 10, 2000, over $44 million in professional fees
had been requested and over $33 million in professional fees had been allowed and presuma-
bly paid by the debtors in these cases. Based upon the orders approving professional fees
entered in these cases thus far, it appears very likely that the remaining $11 million in fees
requested as of October 10,2000 will be allowed as requested. Additionally, these cases are
nowhere near completion. None of these debtors have proposed, let alone confirmed, a Chap-
ter II plan, suggesting that millions of additional professional fees will be paid in these cases
before they are resolved. All data supporting this footnote is on file with author, Nathalie
Martin.
107 See Lawrence P. Schnapf, CERCLA and the Substantial Continuity Test: A Unifying
Proposalfir Imposing CERCLA Liability Asset on Purchasers, 4 ENVTL. LAw 435, 507 (1998)
(stating that the purpose of Chapter II is to "restructure a business so that it may operate,
employ workers, pay its creditors, and produce a return for shareholders).
1o8 See Nathalie Martin, Noneconomic Interest in Bankruptcy: Standing on the Outside
Looking In, 59 OHIO STATE L.J. 429, 446-52 (1998).
1O9 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 833, 106" Cong. § 1104 (1999).
1 Io See Martin, supra note 108, at 446-52.
I 1 1 See Peterman, supra note 10, at 20-24, which contains a lively conversation about the
difficulty of balancing economic and non-economic interests. See generally Martin, supra
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Thus, it is unclear what practical ramifications these bankruptcies will
have on residents and patients.
E. THE EFFECT OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE ON STATE STATUTES
REGULATING PATIENT CARE
Theoretically, the mere fact that a bankruptcy has been filed should
not reduce the quality of care that residents and patients receive. State
health guideline regulations should continue to be enforced. The Bank-
ruptcy Code, however, under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, overrides some state laws.'' 2 Thus, the automatic stay imposed
upon bankruptcy may give homes and providers some flexibility in meet-
ing state regulatory guidelines.' 13 For example, in the past, bankruptcy
courts have refused to uphold licensing and certification statutes for nurs-
ing homes and hospitals because the statutory standard for obtaining a
license was based upon financial condition, or because enforcing the stat-
ute would have a detrimental effect on the debtor's reorganization ef-
forts.' 14 In light of these precedents, courts might also refuse to enforce
statutes that regulate minimum levels of staffing, assuming that the
debtor could not afford to hire enough staff persons.' ' 5 While some state
regulations will continue to be enforced in bankruptcy, there is no reason
to believe that all such regulations will be enforced, particularly if they
make it difficult for the debtor to reorganize.
Thus, for a number of reasons, nursing home and home-health care
bankruptcies could have a very negative impact on the recipients of such
care.' 6 First, the large costs of Chapter II could make it difficult for
homes and agencies to operate at a profit. Second, a nursing home could
stay operational but offer compromised care as a result of its financial
condition. Third, the state statutes that purport to protect residents and
patients might not be enforced if enforcement would interfere with the
debtor's reorganization efforts. Finally, whether and how a bankruptcy
note 1)8 (in which one of the authors of this article dedicates 70 pages to this issue). Of
course, it is always possible that a bankruptcy court could impose even tougher standards on
patient care than a state would. Recently, in an unprecedented move, the Bankruptcy Court in
the Vencor case approved an arrangement under which the federal government will oversee
Vencor's patient care quality while it completes its reorganization effort. See Chris Adams,
Vencor to Give U.S. the Power to Oversee Care, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2000, at B2.
112 See U.S. CONST, art. VI, cl. 2; MARTIN J. BIENENSTOCK, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZA-
TION 90 (1987).
113 See II U.S.C. § 362 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999) ; Nathalie Martin, The Insolvent Life-
Care Provider: Who Leads the Dance Between the Federal Code and State Continuing Care
Statutes? 61 OHIO STATE L.J. 267, 296 n.164. In this article, one of the authors discusses
various ways in which bankruptcy courts can avoid enforcing state statutes that make it more
difficult for a debtor-corporation to reorganize. See id.
114 See Martin, supra note 113, at 296.
115 See Pear, supra note 8, at AI.
116 See supra Part I11.
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court would attempt to protect the non-economic interests of residents
and patients is entirely unknown. None of these potential harms are in-
evitable; all could have been avoided and can still be avoided in the
future.
III. LIMITATIONS ON AVAILABLE CARE SINCE THE BBA
The fact that many homes and providers are in bankruptcy is not a
primary cause for concern. These bankruptcies are merely a symptom of
industry-wide financial problems. What is a primary cause for concern,
however, is that some people can no longer gain access to nursing care,
as a direct result of the reimbursement cuts. The reason for this is that
the new reimbursement scheme induces providers to refuse care to the
sickest patients.
While insisting that care standards will not change as a result of the
changed reimbursement policies, the December 1999 GAO report admits
that the new reimbursement policies have made it harder for some pa-
tients to gain admission to nursing homes. 1 7 According to the report,
nursing homes are being far more selective in accepting patients since
the enactment of the BBA."18 Nursing homes are now turning away
sicker patients because caring for these patients could cause the provider
to lose money.' 19 Healthy patients, on the other hand, are seen as assets
that could help a home return to solvency. The admissions process has
become so competitive in some places that homes are requesting exten-
sive medical records and drug charts before granting admission.' 2° Some
homes are even going to hospitals to interview patients and assess their
condition before granting them admission. 12 This change constitutes
more than a minor inconvenience. This denial of access creates a per-
verse form of "health care" in which the healthy are welcome but the
sick are turned away.
Access problems are even more pronounced in the home-health care
industry. 22 The GAO report relating to home-health care insists that the
cuts simply put the weaker agencies out of business, that the cuts only
117 See DEC. 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 7 at 2.
1 18 See id.
119 See Fischer, supra note 4, at POIA (quoting one nursing home administrator as saying
that he would hesitate to take someone with 24-hour ventilator needs because his facility
would be unable to provide that care under the current reimbursement system). While homes
and home-health care providers sometimes get more money for sicker patients under the new
system, they do not get enough more money to cover the higher costs of caring for these
people. Thus, the financial incentives do not encourage providers to treat or accept sicker
patients: those most in need find it hardest to obtain treatment and care.
120 See Adams, supra note 39, at A20.
121 See id.
122 See Adams, supra note 35 (stating that as many as fifty percent of home health agen-
cies have gone out of business since the Medicare cuts).
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affected agencies that were abusing the system and providing unneces-
sary care, and that there are still plenty of providers available to provide
care. 123 In reality, the cuts punished the providers that were efficient, by
making across the board percentage cuts that could only be endured by
previously inefficient providers.124
In light of the fact that people are being denied access to publicly
funded nursing homes and home-health care for financial reason, the
GAO's many statements that care is not being affected by the cuts are
empty. Even if it were true that people who were actually receiving care
were still receiving the same quality of care, the care has changed mark-
edly for people who cannot gain access to long-term care. The available
care for these individuals has gone from at least tolerable to non-existent.
Although the GAO reports that patients are still getting the care they
need, it is not true. When the sickest elderly people in America cannot
gain access to a nursing home, or to comparable home-health care, these
industries have failed. We do not need thousands of bankruptcies to es-
tablish that.
IV. ESTABLISHING OUR NATIONAL POLICY TOWARD
FUNDING LONG-TERM CARE: UNEARTHING
THE TABOOS
Congress had reason to be concerned about fraud and profligate
spending among long-term care providers. According to many sources,
including authors of scholarly articles, the system of reimbursing unlim-
ited rehabilitation services created the wrong incentives. 125 Neverthe-
less, it seems unlikely that Congress recognized the full economic impact
that the BBA would have on these industries. 126 Put another way, it
seems unlikely that the purpose behind the BBA was to bankrupt the
nursing home and the home-health care industries. 27 While this may not
123 See generally MAY 1999 GAO REPORT, supra note 7. This report acknowledges that
the revenue cuts were hardest on agencies that "provided more visits per user, for smaller
agencies, and for those less able to recruit low-cost patients." ht. at 3. The same report states
that "the beneficiaries who are likely to be costlier than average to treat may have increased
difficulty in obtaining health care." Id. at 24.
124 See Kelly, suqpa note 4, at A l. In other words, only agencies that had fat to cut could
endure the cuts. Thus, many of the most efficient providers, as well as those providing ser-
vices to the poor, are now out of business. See id.
125 Home-health care was the fastest growing part of the Medicare budget, and increased
its budget from 2.6 billion to 17.2 billion between 19X9 and 1997. See COMM. ON GOV'T
REFORM & OVERSIGHT, supra note I1, at 4. False claims were also common. See id. at 5.
Thus, this industry was an easy target for cuts.
126 See Fischer, siqpra note 4, at P01A.
127 See COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM & OVERSIGHT, supra note II at 4 ("To address the
continuing problems of waste, fraud, and abuse in the home health program, the Congress
proposed several changes to the home health program, contained in the Balanced Budget Act
of 1997.").
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have been a result that Congress intended, it was certainly foreseeable
that the cuts in Medicare mandated by the BBA, would have an adverse
effect on health care programs that served the elderly, and thus on the
health of the elderly themselves. However, Congress was quite willing
to take this risk.
Congress' goals in cutting Medicare spending appear either overly
simplistic or, more cynically, elusive and convoluted. One goal may
have been to eliminate some of the less profitable facilities or to elimi-
nate those that were no longer considered necessary. Some economists
and analysts claim that traditional nursing home care is less in demand
now that continuing-care contracts, assisted living facilities, and home-
health care are available.1 28 Yet for most people, these other options can
only be accessed through private funds. 129 Since most people cannot
afford to fully fund their own long-term care, the usual method of paying
for long-term care is to expend one's own assets first, and then go on
Medicaid' 3" after exhausting private funds.13 ' For most people, Medi-
caid funds nursing home care, but not the other options for care. 132
Thus, most of these options are temporary and do not eliminate the need
for many people to move to a nursing home at a later time. 133 Demo-
graphic studies show that as the number of aging people increases, more
care will be needed for chronic health problems.' 34 The population is
128 See Analysts: Nursing Home Companies Face Many' Dificulties, FED. FILING NEW-
SWIRES, Jan. 18, 2000.
129 See Nathalie Martin, Funding Long-Term Care: Some Risk-Spreaders Create More
Risk Than They Cure, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.& POL. 335, 356-66 (2000).
130 Medicare is a federal health insurance program for the elderly (age 65 or older) and for
certain disabled persons. Eligibility and benefits are the same throughout the country. Medi-
caid is a public health care program that serves low-income people. It is funded by both State
and federal funds. Medicaid programs are administered by the individual states, and each
state's Medicaid program has different eligibility rules and benefits. See National Asian Pa-
cific Center on Aging, Medicare v. Medicaid, at http://www.napca.org/mvsm.html (last visited
April 8, 2001).
131 See Schifano & Zucarelli, supra note 57, at 9A.
132 See id.
133 See Martin, supra note 129, at 356-59, 360-66. People can only live in assisted living
for as long as they can care for themselves, so many people move to a nursing home after
living in assisted living. See id. at 360-61. All of the options to traditional nursing homes are
so expensive that the average person will expend their funds on home-health care or assisted
living before they die, requiring a later move to a Medicaid-funded nursing home. See id. at
365-66.
134 See Analysts, supra note 128. Because nursing homes tend to be depressing places
that most people want to avoid, and because initial studies show that some care can be pro-
vided more economically at home, we had hoped that American long-term care Was moving
away from nursing care and toward a home-health care model. In fact, a recent Supreme Court
case, Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), mandates that care be provided in the least
obtrusive way possible. Because home health care is less intrusive than care provided in group
homes this case suggests that states may be required to provide more home care in lieu of
nursing-home care. Now, however, this does not seem to be possible. The home-health care
industry has shrunk rather than grown, and is serving a far smaller portion of the population.
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aging and birth rates are down. 135 While there are plenty of Americans
working today, thus funding both Social Security and national long-term
care costs, as the baby boomers age, there will be fewer Americans
working, resulting in fewer tax dollars available to fund the nation's
long-term care costs. Thus, there is no reason to think that we have more
nursing homes than we need. Moreover, given our future needs, we
should be increasing rather than decreasing funding for long-term care,
as well as investing some public funds for future long-term care costs.
Consequently, if Congress' goal were to eliminate "unnecessary" facili-
ties, Congress was, at best, acting in a shortsightedly and without full
information. At worst, Congress was aware of the impact that the BBA
would have on elderly people who would eventually need nursing home
care, but did not consider this to be a serious concern.
As a society, we have not yet established our goals or priorities with
respect to long-term care, and certainly have not engaged in a public
discourse about which long-term care services we actually want to pay
for with public funds. 136 Moreover, we have not decided which services
really are necessary versus those that are unnecessary. 137 We have not
established guidelines for what quality of care is required to be provided
or even examined whether Americans have a right to long-term care paid
for through Medicare. 138 If we are going to change the amount of federal
Thus, it is impractical at this point to move toward home-health care and away form nursing
home care. If this is our goal as a society, we must find ways to tighten the controls on
fraudulent claims and unnecessary services, without eliminating so much badly needed care.
135 Erick J. Bohlman, Financing Strategies: Long-Term Care for the Elderly, 2 ELDER
L.J. 167, 167 n.4 (1994). According to Bohlman, in 1900, 4% of the population was age sixty-
five or older. Id. By 1977, 10.8% of the population was sixty-five or older. Id. By 1980, that
figure had increased to 11%. Id. Projections are that by 2010, 12.7% of the population will be
at least sixty-five, and that by 2030, 18.3% of the population will have reached that age. Id.
Within only fifty years, nearly one out of every five living Americans will be "elderly" by our
current standards. Id. Furthermore, the "elderly" as a group are getting older; the percentage
of elderly individuals at least seventy-five years of age will rise from 37.7% of the total elderly
population as of 1977 to 42.1% by 2030. Id.
136 Several studies show that prior to the BBA, providers rendered services that were not
necessary in order to increase profits. See COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM & OVERSIGHT, supra
note II at 5-11.
137 What about therapies that have been proven to expand the human life span? An even
more difficult question is whether we want to extend the human life span? Do we want to
expand the human life span in all cases, or only if the person has her own funds and can lead a
relatively healthy and meaningful life, whatever that means? Finally, do we want as a society
to pay for the care a person receives toward the end of a long life?
138 It appears that there is no Constitutional right to health care or welfare benefits. See,
e.g., Scott D. Littman, Health Care Reform for the Twenty-First Centuryv: The Need for a
Federal and State Partnership, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 871, 877 (1998)(healthcare);
April Land, Children in Povert,: In Search of State and Federal Protections fi)r Children in
the Wake of Welfare Reform, __ UTAH L. REV. (2000) (forthcoming)(welfare). Perhaps it
follows that there is no right to long-term care paid for through Medicare. However, Medicare
has paid for such care, for both the poor and the middle class, for over four decades.
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funds directed at this care, or its quality or availability, we should make
the decision to do so consciously. Yet Congress did not do this when it
promulgated the BBA.
Some people openly wish to change the level of support for long-
term care to make it less expensive and less available. One congressman
flatly stated, when asked about the effects of the cuts, that Medicare was
never meant to be a welfare program.139 Proponents of the "intergenera-
tional equity movement" believe that we are spending too much of our
federal and state budgets on the elderly. 14 According to proponents of
this view, the elderly are receiving a disproportionately large share of the
available federal funding, so that "a generation of young Americans will
eventually live in financial slavery, amidst a deteriorating environment
and crumbling infrastructures . . .,,141 Other proponents of intergenera-
tional equity claim that the current system is tantamount to fiscal child
abuse. 142
These may sound like fringe rather than mainstream ideas, but they
may be more common than we realize. In a speech to Congress on Feb-
ruary 8, 2000, David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States,
expressed intergenerational ideas when he cautioned Congress to be
careful in reversing cuts mandated by the BBA.' 43 He noted that after
thirty years of deficits, a "combination of hard choices and remarkable
economic growth has created a budget surplus."' 44 He asked that before
reversing the BBA, Congress do a careful assessment of the effects the
reversals will have. 145 While admitting that the financial ramifications of
the BBA "can be far off the mark,"' 46 he nevertheless asked Congress to
separate the trivial from the important and to resist demands of special
interest groups. ' 47
139 See CONGRESS DAILY A.M., July 26, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2418723(0 (Fortney
(Pete) Stark, D-Calif., stated, "Medicare was a program set up in 1965 to help the nation's
seniors and disabled .... It is not a provider Isici welfare program.").
140 Hans Riemer & Christopher Cuomo, The Generation Gambit: The Right's Imaginarv
Rift Between the Young and the Old, at http://www.fair.org/extra/9703/generation.html (Mar./
Apr. 1997).
141 Richard Chin, Public Benefits Debate Becomes War of the Ages: How to Divide Re-
sources Fairly is a Heated Issue, PIONEER PRESS, http://www.pioneerplanet.com/archive/gen/
dox/genl4.htm (Nov. 17, 1996).
142 See id.
143 See Medicare: Program Refirm and Modernization Are Needed But Entail Considera-
ble Challenges: Hearing Befre the Senate the Special Comm. on Aging, 10 6 h Cong. 1 (2000)
(statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States).
144 Id. at 1.
145 See id. at 4.
146 Id. at 22.
147 See id. at 23 ("Steadfastness is needed when particular interest pit the primacy of their
needs against the more global interests of making Medicare affordable, sustainable, and effec-
tive for current and future generations of Americans.").
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He noted that we must be careful to use the surplus to improve pros-
pects for future generations.14 He referred to the present generation as
the stewards for future generations, 149 and asked Congress to recognize
that health care costs necessarily "compete with other legitimate priori-
ties in the budget."'1511 He claimed that the projected growth of health
care costs "threatens to crowd out future generations' flexibility to decide
which of these competing priorities will be met."' 151 He stated that to-
day's generation has a responsibility toward future generations to reduce
the debt burden they will inherit and to provide a strong foundation for
future income growth. 152 Perhaps he was willing to state directly what
Congress would not: that in order to save money for other priorities, the
federal government must be willing to sacrifice some of the elderly's
needs. This level of bluntness is not likely to win votes for members of
Congress, which may be why Congress will not be honest about what is
happening, but unelected officials will.
Our health plan is known as one of the most expensive and inequita-
ble health-care system in the world, 153 and a huge percentage of our
health care resources are spent on long-term care. 154 Does this make
young people angry or resentful?155 Was concern over intergenerational
equity in the back of the minds of Congress when they passed the Bal-
anced Budget Act? Common sense suggests that the answer is no. 156
Rather than being motivated by intergenerational equity, Congress did
not appear to know or understand exactly what it was doing. 157 But it
148 See id.
149 See id.
151 Id. at 3.
151 See id. at 3.
152 See id. at 22.
153 See Candace Johnson Redden, Rationing Care in the Communit: Engaging Citizens
in Health Care Decision Making, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1363, 1366 (1999).
154 See Nina J. Crimm, Tax Plan for the Twent,-First Century: Medical Incentive Vouch-
ers Address the Needs of Academic Health Centers and the Elderly, 71 TUL. L. REV. 653, 667-
68 (1997). This author notes that health care expenditures for the elderly greatly exceed those
of the population in general and that health care for the elderly accounts for a disproportionate
share of the nation's health care costs. See id at 667; see also Edward P. Richards, Past as
Prologue: Can Managed Care Overcome the Conflicts Inherited fiom Fee-for-Service
Medicine, 66 UMKC L. REV. 735, 740 (1998). As people live longer the absolute number of
person needing health care increases. Thereafter, lifesaving measures that were not available
50 years ago add to these numbers. See id. at 741. Moreover, older people generally require
more care than younger people, and at the same time, these people are frequently not working
and therefore not contributing to the Gross National Product. See id. at 740. Necessarily,
these demographic trends drive up the overall costs of health care in this country. See id.
155 We of course assume that older people want to keep whatever services we currently
have for the elderly, because they may need the services themselves.
156 Most of the members of Congress are older, or at least have parents that could need
long-term care. One would expect Congress to act in both self-interest and national interest.
157 See Fischer, supra note 4, at POIA. Senator Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia has
acknowledged that Congress enacted the BBA without having any idea of its real effects. See
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should know what it is doing. At least someone should know what we as
a nation are doing about long-term care; what we are doing to see that it
is adequate today and what we are doing to see that it will be adequate
twenty years from now. We need a separate, more informed process and
forum for establishing our national priorities with respect to funding
long-term care. This complex discussion cannot take place on the House
and Senate floors, amidst discussions of numerous other issues. Con-
gress needs far more direction from policy makers about how budget cuts
will affect the public, and should not be permitted to make cuts without
such direction.
Moreover, it is unlikely that Congress can discuss this taboo issue
without losing voter support. Consequently, the conversation about pub-
lic funding for long-term care must occur elsewhere, perhaps through a
task force, a study by professionals within these industries, a national
referendum, or another less political forum. One way or another, we as a
society must decide how issues regarding the payment for long-term care
will be made, and this must be done sooner rather than later.
We also must address the inevitable issue of health-care rationing.
Virtually every country with a comprehensive health-care plan has overt
guidelines for rationing health care. 158 The goal of rationing plans is to
ensure that everyone receives some level of health care - that one group
in society does not hoard it. Some scholars believe that rationing should
be avoided because they worry about fair allocation of health care ser-
vices or fear that they themselves may be denied needed care. 159 Ration-
ing, however, cannot be avoided when funds are limited. Whether a
country or state implements an overt rationing scheme or not, rationing
happens. In places without overt rationing schemes, rationing decisions
id. In his own words, "we made a mistake." Id. Another congressman from West Virginia
seemed aware of the effects the legislation would have. See id. Representative Nick Joe
Rahall, who voted against the cuts, states, "It was destined to cause problems and it did and it
does." Id. He thought all along "balancing the budget on the backs of seniors was a bad idea."
Id.
158 See Eric Lammond Robinson, Note, The Oregon Health Services Act: A Model for
State Refornt?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 977, 985-6 (1992). As this author explains, the United
States must eventually face the fact that rationing is a necessity, because like all other coun-
tries in the world, our health care system cannot possibly serve all legitimate needs: it's just
not financially possible. Even countries with universal health care ration care as a financial
necessity. See also Lawrence 0. Gostin, Scott Burris & Zita Lazzarini, The Law and the
Public's Health: A Study sY'Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 9,
128 (1999) (noting that despite philosophical resistance to it, the Unites States does ration
health care, as do all other countries in the world): Michael J. Malinowski, Globalization of
Biotechnology and the Public Health Challenges Accompanying It, 60 ALB. L. REV. 119, 148.
(1996) (noting that rationing is relatively well accepted in Britain, where it has taken place
openly, under nationalized medicine). There are drastic differences in the number of patients
who receive surgery, or even chemotherapy for cancer, however, when health care is rationed.
See id. at 169 n.148.
159 See Robinson, supra note 158, at 984.
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are made by individual health care providers, based on the circumstances
of the case. 161 These informal bedside rationing policies force healthcare
providers to make the tough decisions while the rest of society pretends
that rationing does not exist..
The BBA rationed health care for the elderly. Rather than imple-
menting such a scheme unknowingly or behind closed doors, it would be
preferable to have a public discourse about rationing long-term care.
That, however, also requires a public discourse about death, something
we seem willing to avoid at all costs. Americans have an unusually un-
healthy attitude toward death and old age, which may lead to our ambiv-
alence and indecision about long-term care. 161
As one of two industrialized societies in the world with no compre-
hensive national heath care plan, 16 2 and as a country with no national
policy toward aging, we need a policy as well as an implementation plan.
Otherwise, we will pass omnibus bills that have not been fully researched
and that Congress does not understand. We cannot rely on Congress to
decide what our national policy with respect to long-term care will be.
Rather, we need to decide what our goals are and then ask Congress to
implement those goals.
160 See Richard D. Lam, Rationing Health Care: Inevitable and Desirable, 140 PA. L.
REV. 1511, 1519-20 (1992).
161 We find this attitude and general fear of death odd, in light of the fact that the majority
of Americans believe in some form of life after death. See OPINIONS '90: EXTRACTS FROM
PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS AND POLLS CONDUCTED BY BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, PROFESSIONAL
AND NEWS ORGANIZATIONS 469 (Chris John Miko & Edward Weilant eds., 1991) (indicating
that 70-80% of Americans believe in eternal life); id. at 477 (indicating that in 1988, 90% of
the people polled in Ohio believed in eternal life). Authors have long written about this pre-
vailing belief in life after death. See JOSEPH HEAD & S. L. CRANSTON, REINCARNATION IN
WORLD THOUGHT 132-33 (1967). Quoting philosopher Paul Tillich, these authors describe
heaven as
a bodiless continuation of the experiences and activities of this life. The classical
doctrine of immortality has become a popular Christian [belief.] .... One continues
to live after one has died in almost the same way, but without a body - blessed
spirits, walking on beautiful meadows.
Id. Given this imagery, it is hard to imagine why anyone would not want to die. Philosophers
and psychologists have long noted that this is not the case, however. See JONATHAN DOL-
LIMORE, DEATH, DESIRE AND Loss IN WESTERN CULTURE 119 (1998). As Freud noted in
1915, in an essay entitled Our Attitude Toward Death, "[wle show an unmistakable tendency
to put death to one side, to eliminate it from life. We Itry] to hush it up." Id. In Bali, by
contrast, death is celebrated as the dead person is moved up the chain of reincarnation, or
directly to heave, through soul purification. See ANGELA HOBART, URS RAMSEYER & AL-
BERYT LEEMAN, THE PEOPLES OF BALI 123-26 (1996). The cremations of Bali are not somber
affairs, but rather happy occasions. See J. STEP-EN LANSING, THE BALINESE 31-33 (1995).
Even in Mexico, the gods of death are revered and respected in the annual celebration of the
day of the dead. See JUANITA GARCIAGODOY, DIGGING THE DAYS OF THE DEAD: A READING
OF MEXICO'S DIAS DE MUERTOS 2-3 (1998): ELIZABETH CARMICHAEL & CHLOE SAYER, THE
SKELETON AT THE FEAST: THE DAY OF THE DEAD IN MEXICO 14-15 (1992).
162 See Robinson, supra note 158, at 980.
